Thinking a lot about memory this week, especially memory in
regards to history. History is conventionally thought of as the record of
events—it’s what happened once upon a time. And when an audience reads a
history there is a strong tendency to see it as truth. That’s it; that’s the
way it happened. It seems the more complete view of history is constructed
through looking at the historical footnotes and trying to determine why they
have been relegated to footnotes. So why is Aspasia lesser known than Socrates?
We have the same amount of written material from here as we do Socrates; she
was incredibly influential; she even ran with the right crowd.
It’s
too easy to throw the “well women weren’t prominent enough at the time”
argument at Aspasia’s exclusion from history. (Plus, dismissing the historical
role of women with that sort of argument makes it suspect if we are willing to
change our method of constructing histories.) Jarrett and Ong note that women
are often defined by their relation to men (12). They also go onto note that
Aspasia—a woman most unusual for her time—fit none of the traditional roles of
a Greek woman. And right there, it seems, we have an answer: Aspasia is
recorded because she was an oddity. This line of reasoning just doesn’t work.
Just
as Welch decries the current state of writing as a “Romantic devolution in with
clichés of an important intellectual movement prevent[s] students and other
writers from participating fully in literacy as consciousness,” I am making a
case for overly simplified systems of memory as shutting out the critical
thought needed to examine culture both past and present. Sure, Aspasia does not
fit the mold of the traditional Greek philosopher/rhetorician. Is the record of
her presence a way of exoticizing her? Is she playing the part of the mystery
woman—a level of sexual and cultural intrigue—in much the same way more modern
literature has contributed to colonial (mis)conceptions like “black wisdom”? Or
has Aspasia fought her way into history—only to have her work diminished
because of her gender? Either way, what we end up with as readers is a less
complete, less dimensional history. When it comes to learning, we have less to
build with and less to build on.
The
larger example here is of course Rhodes. As Enos notes in his chapter, “our
history of Greek rhetoric is inordinately disproportional” (183). Most of the
rhetoric studied in the modern context is born out of Athens and then labeled
broadly as Greek, leading to the misconception of rhetoric as a whole. By
broadly defining dynamic movements in history, we turn interaction into
artifact—a move that, in turn, lessens our understanding of rhetorical nuance.
At the present moment we see rhetoric as something handed down like a family
heirloom—from Classical to Medieval to Renaissance. Just look at the title of
our authoritative text, The Rhetorical Tradition. The—as in the one and
only—singular Rhetorical Tradition. It’s almost to say, here is the one true
path to rhetoric knowledge; now go on to study it as a holy text. (Ignore the
part where the European Dark Ages rehashed Classical Rhetoric without progress
while Mideastern Rhetorics exploded with new concepts like algebra by looking
at—and engaging with—the “footnotes” of Classical rhetoric.) Why do we have this
tradition if it is so stifling?
Let
me sidetrack for a moment: Look at our own conceptions of history. Who is the
first president of the United States? It’s not George Washington. Yes, we might
know him traditionally as Number 1. But a more discerning look at history shows
some gaps: The US became independent in 1776. George was elected in 1789. So
what happened for 13 years? Well, that was the period of time where we had the
failed experiment of the Articles of Confederation. Under the Articles we also
had a president—a new one elected by congress every year. So the first
president was a guy named John Hanson. There were a whole mess of other
presidents before the Constitution was drafted and George came out of
retirement for one last big job. It seems we’ve selected the successful parts
of history and put them together to create a story that harkens back to the
English Lady of the Lake.
I’m
going to go out on a limb here and say that we record history to become a thing
of myth. Aspasia’s presence as teacher and companion to Socrates ruins the holy
(bearded) trinity of Socrates, Plato, Aristotle. Acknowledging the rhetoric of
Rhodes also diminishes the mythic status of the birth of rhetoric. It’s a same
really. At the end of his chapter, Enos contends that there are still “rhetorical
riches yet to be discovered on the island of Rhodes” (194). They’ve been
discovered; they just need to be remembered this time around.
I like your idea of reading history in the footnotes and when you say, "I am making a case for overly simplified systems of memory as shutting out the critical thought needed to examine culture both past and present."
ReplyDeleteI've been thinking about memory a lot lately too--I wrote about it (in a way) back in Research Methods and I'm thinking of doing a more focused inquiry into memory for the short paper. One idea I've come across (though only in abstract form--I mean, literally, reading the abstract for the paper :) is the concept of "performative memory." And, to an extent, that seems to be something you're making a case for here. Stories aren't simply dismissed in our histories, they are just performed differently by those who reenact them--whether in mystery plays, conversation, scholarship, etc. In that selected performance, those in the footnotes are also "performed" differently. So I like the way you discuss dismissiveness here. If we just understand Aspasia's relegation to the margins as indicative of cultural norms, we skip over the ways her memory (or whole traditions?) was performed.
Oops. I think I just used your blog post for invention work on my first paper :)