Tuesday, October 9, 2012

Science, religion, and publicity


The Enlightenment seems to be mostly about the formation of communication systems (the same systems that not much later just become extensions of the Medieval systems of power). Here I am defining system broadly—a network formed by affinity spaces essentially (to borrow from games scholar James Gee). As Bizzel and Herzberg note in their introduction to John Locke “complex ideas are formed by the connections among simple ideas” (815). While this is just a network of thought, it’s the connections that fascinate me. Locke, Vico, and the scientists of the Enlightenment are concerned with connecting and synthesizing their thoughts through language and reflection. In networking these thoughts, new ideas are derived at through synthesis.  
             I guess what I’m concerned with here is relating (networking) the larger societal movements with the ones going on in the heads of the Enlightenment folks. As print became a dominant force, it would be easy to paint the Enlightenment as a panacea of shared knowledge—a lofty notion Ortelius floats when devising his atlas (Eisenstein, 85). But the connections between ideas effect more than knowledge. Eisenstein notes that the advent of print brought “together intellectual and commercial activities which reinforced each other and thus created an especially powerful, almost irresistible drive” (75). The result is aptly described as “a knowledge explosion” (83)—a term fitting something that happens so quickly and has so much potential to clear a path or destroy or both. Print created new relationships which I examine here in the next paragraph; however, print itself became a system that muddied how we arrive at truth. For science and religion—two systems engaged in the pursuit of Truth—print acted for and against them.
            In the later chapters of Eisenstein’s book, she notes how print put religion into conversation with science. The relationship, despite some commonly-held beliefs, was not entirely antagonistic. Some science set out to “prove” or build onto religious ideas. Eisenstein poetically refers to this as “spreading God’s words” versus “deciphering His handiwork” (298). Scientific notions could be shared through dessemination, negating the need for the “wandering scholar” (47). On a darker note, print also facilitated the “output of polemical tracts to sway opinion,” a key tactic used by both the Catholic and Protestant Churches.  What I see here is the first effective use of propaganda. (Yes, there had been smearing and rumor before, but the ethos print lends itself to ideas like “popular opinion” and “news” in ways orality could not.) And with the dawn of new media and propaganda (now an old idea), we have the formation of publicity. Venues for certain types of print become reconsidered, much like Luther’s tacking of theses to a church door (168). Probably most significant though is the “deliberate exploitation of the new medium” (170).
            Toward the end of her book, Eisenstein explicitly notes the impact of publicity on science and religion as well as the effect it had on the relationship between the two systems. As the Churches grew accustomed and adept to print publicity, science begins to distrust it. The very thing that put ideas in conversation becomes something to be feared (298). Repeatedly, Eisenstein uses the word paradox in describing the print revolution, another fitting term. Perhaps most paradoxically is the idea she advances early in the book—that “printers not only compete with rivals and improve on their predecessors. They are able to improve on themselves” (81). The networking allows for advancement. Yet, the network formed with and by economies stymies pure growth while being stimulated. (i.e. The idea that the second edition could improve on the first—a way of sandbagging knowledge. Ahem, textbooks...) 

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